Dematerialization, represented by declining consumption per GDP of energy or of goods, offers some hope for rising environmental quality with development. The declining proportion of income spent on staples as affluence grows, which income elasticity <1.0 measures, makes dematerialization widespread. Further, as learning improves efficiency of resource use, the intensity of environmental impact per production of staples often declines. We observe that combinations of low income elasticity for staples and of learning by producers cause a variety of dematerializations and declining intensities of impact, from energy use and carbon emission to food consumption and fertilizer use, globally and in countries ranging from the United States and France to China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia. Because dematerialization and intensity of impact are ratios of parameters that may be variously defined and are sometimes difficult to estimate, their fluctuations must be interpreted cautiously. Nevertheless, substantial declining intensity of impact, and especially, dematerialization persisted between 1980 and 2006.
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carbon ͉ cropland ͉ energy ͉ fertilizer ͉ impact I f consumers dematerialize their intensity of use of goods and technicians produce the goods with a lower intensity of impact, people can grow in numbers and affluence without a proportionally greater environmental impact (1) . For example, the intensity of energy use equals joules per GDP, and intensity of impact equals carbon emission per joule. If the combined intensities of use and impact decline, an economy decarbonizes.
Are dematerialization and declining intensity of impact unfortunately ending, or more fortunately, can they continue ameliorating worries about humanity's impact on the environment, especially changing climate? We test whether dematerialization and declining intensities of impact can be depended on to alleviate anxiety about carbon from energy use, concerns about farming, fertilizer, and forestry. Dare humanity project that consumers will promote sustainability by dematerialization, and project that technologists will promote it by lowering the intensity of impact?
Recent Chinese and American statements about carbon emission exemplify the arrival of the intensities of use and impact at the crux of affairs. Rather than emitting fewer tons of carbon, ''[China] reiterated the target that it set a year ago of reducing energy consumption per unit of economic output by 20% between 2006 and 2010.'' (2). The U.S. target combined dematerialization and decarbonization: ''Reducing U.S. emissions intensity by 18% between 2002 and 2012.'' (3). Asian-Pacific nations wrote the Sydney Declaration on climate change in terms of lower energy intensity (4) . (Italics added).
At the same time that the complementary intensities of use and of impact define national goals, they also indicate progress toward sustainability. The World Commission on Environment and Development defined sustainable development with the dual dimensions of 1) meeting the needs of the present and 2) not compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (5) . Consistent with these dual dimensions, intensities also have twin dimensions. One dimension of the intensity of use is the GDP that measures economic development or affluence that the present generation enjoys. The other dimension is the consumption of a quantity that may either subtract from resources or harm the environment that future generations will inherit. Thus, stating a national goal in terms of intensity of use suits it to map sustainability. Similarly, the intensity of impact has twin dimensions: An environmental impact like carbon emission divided by a consumption like energy use. Combined, intensity of use and impact can, for example, map carbon emission intensity, whose dimensions are emission divided by GDP. Mapped as functions of affluence measured by per capita GDP, the intensities of use and of impact chart journeys of economic development and sustainability on two-dimensional planes.
During past years, dematerialization and declining intensity of impact have ameliorated a range of humanity's environmental impacts, from the carbon emission attending energy use to the cropland and fertilizer attending food production, and the use of wood (6) . Now, the elevation of dematerialization and decarbonization to the crux of affairs plus a fear that ''The carbon intensity of the world's economy has stopped decreasing (after 100 years of doing so).'' (7) (8) (9) sharpen the need for a reassessment. Accordingly, we examine the variety of intensities, the caution needed when interpreting their change, and the evidence that their improvement may persist.
Our assessment employs the ImPACT identity (6), which relates an environmental impact Im to four parameters: Population P, affluence A as GDP per person, consumers' intensity of use C per GDP, and technologists' intensity of impact T per goods used, Table 1 . If lowercase symbols represent annual percentage changes, affluence changes by a, intensity of use by c, and intensity of impact by t %/yr. When, for example, a nation increases its GDP 4% and consumers use only 1% more joules of energy, the ratio of joules to GDP falls, making c equal to minus 3%/yr.
Regarding affluence rather than mere passage of years to be the lever that moves intensities, we chart intensity versus affluence rather than versus years. To show how affluence sometimes worsens, sometimes improves the environment, the World Bank also graphed indicators versus affluence (10) . On a chart of intensity of use C versus affluence A, dematerialization appears as a downward slope of (c/a). The graph of 4%/yr more affluence and 3%/yr less use per GDP slopes downward at the dematerialization rate (c/a) of minus 3 ⁄4. This definition connects dematerialization to the income elasticity b that economists have long calculated. Dematerialization (c/a) equals (b-1), which equates the dematerialization of -3 ⁄4 to an income elasticity of 1 ⁄4 that represents a staple rather than a luxury. In rich and poor countries, approximate income elasticities for food are 0.3 and 0.7 (11) and for energy are 0.4 and 0.6 (12), which foreshadow dematerializations of Ϫ0.7 to Ϫ0.3. Where income elasticity is 0.3, a 10% increase in per capita affluence increases the per capita demand for food only 3% because the intensity of use dematerializes by 7%.
Charts that show consumers' dematerialization and income elasticity can also show how fast technologists change the intensity of the impact of producing the consumed goods. Consider an example of income elasticity 0.3 for food, 10% more affluence, 7% less intensity of use, and 3% more consumption per GDP. Technology could forestall the impact of plowing more land per capita by lowering the intensity of impact with 3% higher yields. Our goal is testing how much the world can depend on dematerialization and declining intensity of impact to help its journey of sustainability as affluence grows, especially by curbing carbon emissions and the impacts of farming, fertilizer, and forestry. In the charts, the general increase of affluence moved the data points rightward. Booms pulled the points farther apart, stagnation pushed them together, and recession during the 1980s placed a few points left of 1980 affluence. The recessions did not clearly reverse dematerialization. During the 24 years, Indian affluence multiplied 2.4-fold. Because DOE reported that per capita energy and carbon emission multiplied about the same as affluence during the same period, it implied the steady intensities of use and impact in Fig. 2 . However, because the International Energy Agency (IEA) included energy from renewables and waste (19, 20) , they implied only a 1.5-fold increase in energy use, and hence the dematerialization during the 2.4 multiplication of affluence plotted in Fig. 2 .
Although IEA included energy from renewables and waste, they did not include the corresponding carbon in estimating emission and so reported about the same emissions as DOE. Dividing the same change in emission by a smaller change in energy use changed IEA's implied intensity of impact 1.6-fold along the rising path seen in the chart. One set of data implied neither dematerialization nor changing intensity of impact, whereas the other implied steady dematerialization but emitting 60% more carbon to produce a joule of energy in 2004 than in 1980.
Chinese dematerialization and intensity of impact calculated from energy and emission estimates by DOE and IEA demonstrate the caution needed concerning brief changes, Fig. 2 
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Income elasticity c/aϩ1, Dimensionless ables and waste in estimating energy use but DOE did not, IEA implied a steeper dematerialization. As in the preceding example of India, IEA's faster dematerialization and omission of emissions from renewables and waste produced an apparent rise of Chinese intensity of impact.
Even in a developed nation, the intensity of impact from 1980 to 2004 or 2006 implied by reports from different methods and agencies requires caution (Fig. 3) . The IEA estimates of U.S. emission by its reference method are more than but increase less than the estimates by its sectoral method. Thus, when the two IEA estimates of emission are divided by the same IEA estimate of energy use, the consequent intensities of use differ from each other. They also differ from DOE intensities of impact. The Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center's (CDIAC) estimates labeled ''Total emissions from fossil-fuels'' (21) include Ϸ1% from cement production and gas flaring and imply that intensity of impact rises instead of falls as other reports imply.
Comparisons of Chinese intensity of use and of impact implied by CDIAC reports of emission reports and DOE of energy clarify the effect of cement. In China in 2004, 36 Tg of China's so-called ''total emissions from fossil-fuels'' came from cement. The 36 Tg from cement exceeded the Italian or South Korean emission from fossil fuel. As Fig. 3 shows, the intensity of Chinese use of cement increased (22) , whereas its energy dematerialized. Consequently, although the intensity of impact calculated from energy decreased slightly, the CDIAC estimate of emissions from energy plus cement implied no decrease.
To encompass more reports of energy and emission than can practically be charted, Tables 2-4 production on land and fertilizer use and persistence of declining French carbon emissions per energy production. For energy and carbon, the world, including rapidly growing China, did interrupt the global dematerialization and declining intensity of impact in 2001, shown in Fig. 4 . Including China, the average global consumer increased affluence by 45% but used only 13% more energy in 2006 than in 1980. Without China, the average consumer increased affluence by 34% while changing energy use little. Outside China, the world persistently dematerialized energy use at 10% per 10% more affluence, corresponding to income elasticity near 0. The world without China retained the smaller intensity of impact of energy production attained during the earlier years.
Discussion
Variety. Because the consumption of many things does not rise as fast as income, the variety of dematerialization should not surprise. A century after this phenomenon was noticed, Houthakker (23) wrote, ''Few dates in the history of econometrics are more significant than 1857. In that year Ernst Engel (1821-1896) published a study on the conditions of production and consumption, in which he formulated an empirical law that the proportion of income spent on food declines as income rises. Similar laws have also been formulated for other items of expenditure.'' Consumption that follows Engel's law has an income elasticity b Ͻ1, dividing staples from luxuries with b Ͼ1. Given the generality of Engel's law, it is no surprise that a variety of energy use, crop production, and wood obey it in Figs. 1 to 4 . The Brazilian exception of rising intensity of energy use seen in Fig. 1 accompanied discovery of petroleum followed by a 10-fold increase of Brazilian oil production from 1980 to 2006 (16) . However, when global, Chinese, or U.S. affluence rose 10%, energy consumption dematerialized Ͼ5%, shown in Fig. 1 . Because dematerialization equals (b-1), these correspond to income elasticity of Ͻ0.5, signifying that energy is a staple.
A variety of substantial decreases in intensity of impact is also evident in Fig. 1 . Although rapid introduction of nuclear power in France occurred in the 1970s, intensity of impact still improved during 1980-2005. The scarcity of other declining intensities of impact for energy and negative t in Table 3 shows that the French performance is exceptional. Nevertheless, the intensity of energy impact for the world outside China is not discouraging, shown in Fig. 4 . The evidence of experience and learning decreasing the intensity of impact for food production ( Fig. 1) is encouraging, and after its peak, the course for fertilizer on crops is also encouraging, shown in Fig. 1 .
Caution. The fortunate lack of recessions and retreats from left to right in the charts requires an overarching warning. Unlike the above abundant evidence of the effect of increasing affluence, evidence of the effect of economic recession is brief. The little evidence in Figs. 1 and 4 shows that decreasing affluence in the 1980s did not markedly change intensities. In the Russian Federation, affluence contracted to 0.7 and then rose to 1.2-fold the 1992 level. The Russian intensity of use of energy rose slightly during the economic downturn but has dematerialized since 1999. The intensity of impact fluctuated irregularly. The evidence of behavior during retreating affluence is, fortunately, brief. Russian performance was calculated from references 14-16. The dramatically different performances of intensities implied for India and illustrated in Fig. 2 caution about the definition of variables. When IEA included the energy from combustible renewables and waste, a steady dematerialization was evident in the developing Indian nation. When, however, DOE omitted combustible renewables and waste, they implied first Indian materialization and then dematerialization. The behavior of the intensity of impact shows the need for further caution. Because IEA includes the energy but not the emission from renewables and waste, they implied a steady growth of intensity of impact.
The effect on intensity of impact when emissions from cement production are included or omitted reinforces the warning about The rates for the world and five nations were calculated from reports by the DOE, BP, and CDIAC, and by the Reference and Sectoral methods of the IEA. Sources: World Bank (GDP), and named agencies. See Table 2 for details.
definition. Because CDIAC included them, the curve for intensity of impact of energy production in the U.S. rose whereas other reports implied an improvement in the emission per energy consumption, shown in Fig. 3 . In China, the intensity of energy use generally dematerialized, whereas that of cement use rose. So, the intensity of impact calculated from CDIAC reports did not improve as implied by other reports (Fig. 3) . Tables 2-4 teach other cautionary lessons. For example, the 1980-1995 annual change of intensity of use in Indonesia calculated from the reports of three agencies ranged from an annual increase of 0.6% to a decrease of 1.4%. Divided by the 4.9% annual rise of affluence during the same period, these correspond to rates (c/a) as different as a materialization of 1% versus a dematerialization of 3% when affluence rises 10%. Although differences among reports, like that of India examined above, may be explained by the inclusion, or not, of renewables and waste, caution is warranted.
In the future, the subtraction of the carbon sequestered in forests will add another need for caution. In 2007 at the climate change meetings in Bali, the World Bank announced the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) to reduce deforestation and degradation and provide a fresh source of financing for the sustainable use of forests (24) . Thus, the acute uncertainty about the increase or loss of carbon in forests (25) can add another cause for caution to the present ones about fuel emissions.
Persistence. Generally, as century-old Engel's law predicts, consumers increase their use of staples more slowly than their affluence grows. Also, producers generally learn to get more from less (26) . Thus, rising intensity of use or impact is exceptional, and the examples of their fall seen in our Figs. are prevalent. In an analog to regression toward the mean, the tendency of exceptional cases to regress toward the prevalent ones encourages continuing dematerialization and falling intensity of impact.
If an elasticity b Ͻ1 defines staples and b Ͼ1 defines luxuries, then because the rate of dematerialization (c/a) equals (b-1), saying staples will cause dematerialization is a tautology. By this logic, the end of dematerialization means that a staple has become a luxury. The persistent dematerializations of energy, crops, and wood evident in the four figures show staples remaining staples. The exceptional materialization of Brazilian energy use is better explained by the extraordinary increase in oil consumption from a new supply (16) rather than by energy becoming a luxury. The late rise of Chinese energy intensity evident in several Figs. was evidently passing rather than caused by energy becoming a luxury. Even when China's energy and emission are included in the global sum, the recent regression in Fig. 4 toward the evident trend of falling intensity of use persisted. In the Indian example of a switch from materialization to dematerialization calculated from DOE reports (Fig. 2) , the omission of energy from renewables and waste is a simpler explanation than a luxury becoming a staple.
More advantageous than persistent dematerialization would be its acceleration. Acceleration is hard to find in Tables 2-4. See Table 2 Nevertheless, during 1995-2004 dematerialization, as indicated by negative c %/yr or (c/a), continued globally and in three large emitters.
The declining intensity of impact expected from producers learning to get more from less is evident in the courses of T for global fertilizer application, cropland use and French energy (Fig. 1) . Sans China, the global intensity of impact for energy remains steadily low (Fig. 4 ). For energy since 1980, Engel's law, nevertheless, has been more effective than learning to get more from less. Between the classic pair of consumer behavior and technical change that can preserve resource amenities (27) , consumer behavior has so far excelled for energy and carbon. Some declining intensities of impact evident in Figs. 1 and 4 and in Tables 2-4 show technologists have sometimes curbed emission per energy. Energy engineers have decreased intensity of impact not only by switching fuel from coal to nuclear as in France but also by lifting efficiency across the span of the energy system from generators through transmission lines to devices used by end-users, such as windows and lamps, where resource productivity growth has persisted for Ͼ4,000 years (28) .
If the intensities of use and impact had not changed for a quarter century from 1980 to 2005 as GDP increased along the horizontal axis of Pg would be worth more than $300 billion, and 0.5 Pg lower intensity of impact be worth more than $70 billion. Although prices on the European Climate Exchange are surely transitory, the magnitude of these sums nevertheless merits precise reports and careful audits.
Cautiously amid conflicting reports in Tables 2-4 , some national outcomes can be perceived.
Y Indonesia materialized by all reports, and reports of changed intensity of impact were erratic. Y Brazilian materialization may have slowed, but how much depends on the statistics used. Y India, by several reports, changed from a worsening to an improving environmental performance. Y Chinese dematerialization slowed a bit, but did not cease by any report, and the rise of its intensity of impact either slowed or reversed.
Surprisingly, apparently unaffected by changes of government and with an income elasticity near 0, the USA dematerialized steadily near 2%/yr throughout the 25 years of Tables 2-4 . Its intensity of impact did not decrease. Firmly established, Engel's law is not failing. The dematerialization of crop, fertilizer and wood use plus the decarbonization of carbon emission per GDP continue. And although a declining intensity of impact is hard to find for energy, it continues for other phenomena. The declining intensities continue assisting the journey across sustainability's dual dimensions of present prosperity without compromising the future environment.
Materials and Methods
Waggoner and Ausubel (6) described the ImPACT identity. Table 5 displays the sources of estimates. 
